LIV Golf Lays Off Its Workforce and Prepares for Bankruptcy While Chasing a New Investor

LIV Golf Lays Off Its Workforce and Prepares for Bankruptcy While Chasing a New Investor
Photo: Photo by Erik Brolin on Unsplash

LIV Golf spent its first three years being defined by the size of the numbers attached to it, nine-figure signing fees, a reported $784 million burned through in its debut season, guaranteed contracts that made headlines on their own before a shot was struck. This week the numbers went the other way. The league has told the majority of its workforce that their jobs will end in the first week of September, according to multiple reports, and the Financial Times reports LIV is preparing to file for bankruptcy protection in a New Jersey federal court as soon as the week of September 7. At its peak LIV employed more than 300 people worldwide. Most of them now have a leaving date.

The money that built the league is leaving

None of this happens in isolation from the announcement Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund made back in April, that it would end its financial backing at the close of the 2026 season. PIF has put more than $5 billion into LIV since the league launched in 2022, covering everything from those enormous individual contracts to team ownership stakes to the operating costs of running fifty-four holes of no-cut golf as a going concern. Losing that backer does not just mean LIV has to find new money. It means LIV has to find new money fast enough to cover obligations that were built around the assumption the old money would keep coming. Reports suggest the league recently sent settlement offers to current players who are still owed guaranteed payments beyond this season, and that those initial offers amounted to only a few cents on the dollar. For a league that sold itself partly on the certainty of guaranteed money, that is as damaging a signal as the layoffs themselves.

A smaller league, and players as owners

The strange part of this story is that it is not simply a collapse. CEO Scott O’Neil said in early August that LIV had secured a new lead investor, one he did not name, and that the deal had been approved by the league’s board with final terms expected to land this month. The vision attached to that money is being called LIV 2.0, a considerably scaled-down operation of ten events instead of fourteen, five so-called team majors at international sites including Australia, South Africa, England, Hong Kong and Mexico, and five team signature events based in the United States. The more striking detail is who would own it. O’Neil’s framing has LIV’s players becoming equity holders in the league itself, and by some accounts majority equity holders, which would be close to unprecedented for a major global sports league built the way this one was, top-down and centrally funded from a single source.

Whether that ownership structure survives contact with a bankruptcy court is the real question hanging over the next few weeks. Chapter 11 is not necessarily the end of an organisation, it is often the mechanism by which a company sheds obligations it cannot meet while continuing to operate under new financial terms, and LIV’s own public framing suggests that is the model here: reduce the workforce, restructure the balance sheet, bring in a right-sized investor, relaunch smaller. LIV is also said to remain in talks with BC Partners Credit over a separate funding arrangement in the range of $250 million to $350 million, on top of whatever the unnamed lead investor brings. None of it is settled. A vendor, Fantasy Interactive, has already taken legal action over unpaid invoices for building the league’s app and website, which is the kind of detail that tends to surface when a company’s cash position becomes public knowledge rather than a private matter between the league and the country funding it.

What it means for the golf people actually watch

For the players who signed with LIV in the early years, this is the reckoning that critics of the guaranteed-money model warned about from the start, that a league underwritten by a single sovereign fund was only ever as stable as that fund’s continued interest. For the players now being asked to become shareholders in a leaner LIV 2.0, it is a genuinely different proposition than the one they signed up for, closer to buying into a startup than collecting an appearance fee. And for golf more broadly, a smaller, ten-event LIV with international team majors changes the shape of the calendar again, just as the sport was settling into an uneasy peace between the tours. The Presidents Cup at Medinah later this month will be played entirely by PGA Tour and international golfers with no LIV representation, a reminder of how separate the two ecosystems remain even as one of them works out whether it survives the autumn in its current form.